Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship Between Pay and Performance

被引：186

作者：

Cao, Xiaping ^{[1
]}

Lemmon, Michael ^{[2
]}

Pan, Xiaofei ^{[3
]}

Qian, Meijun ^{[4
]}

Tian, Gary ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou 510000, Guangdong, Peoples R China

[2] BlackRock, San Francisco, CA 94102 USA

[3] Univ Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2500, Australia

[4] Australian Natl Univ, Res Sch Finance Actuarial Studies & Stat, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia

[5] Macquarie Univ, N Ryde, NSW 2019, Australia

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2019年 / 65卷 / 07期

关键词：

managerial incentives; political promotion; performance; CEO compensation; RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; CAREER CONCERNS; COMPENSATION; TURNOVER;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.2017.2966

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that managers' career concerns can serve as an important source of implicit economic incentives. We examine how incentives for political promotion are related to compensation policy and firm performance in Chinese state-owned enterprises. We find that the likelihood that the CEO receives a political promotion is positively related to firm performance. We also find that CEOs with a higher likelihood of political promotion have lower pay levels and lower pay-performance sensitivity. Overall, the evidence suggests that competition in the political job market helps mitigate weak monetary incentives for CEOs in China.

引用

页码：2947 / 2965

页数：19

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