Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue

被引：5

作者：

Abeywickrama, Raneetha ^{[1
]}

Haviv, Moshe ^{[2
,3
]}

Oz, Binyamin ^{[1
,4
]}

Ziedins, Ilze ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Auckland, Dept Stat, Auckland, New Zealand

[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Stat, Jerusalem, Israel

[3] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Federmann Ctr Study Rat, Jerusalem, Israel

[4] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Sch Business Adm, Jerusalem, Israel

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2019年 / 47卷 / 03期

基金：

以色列科学基金会;

关键词：

Accumulating priority queue; Strategic behavior in queues; Equilibrium strategies;

D O I：

10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：162 / 167

页数：6

共 14 条

[11] Nonlinear Accumulating Priority Queues with Equivalent Linear Proxies [J].