Informal government preferences and asymmetric land allocation in China

Whether governments have informal preferences toward firms when allocating land resources and the effects of such preferences on regional development remain unclear, particularly in countries with weak formal institutions. This paper investigates the government's informal preferences in land allocations in China. Substantial evidence is found that politically connected firms are preferred to win land auctions at lower prices due to two different reasons. These preferences are informally achieved through a two-stage auction mechanism rather than formal bid preference programs, and result in the asymmetrical allocation of urban land in terms of land quality, quantity, and price, across politically and non-politically connected firms in China. The state-owned enterprises are allocated poor quality land parcels at 55% land price discounts. In comparison, the manager-based politically connected firms are allocated regular land parcels at 6% price discounts, and other firms without connections with the government are allocated regular land at higher prices.