Labor Selection, Turnover Costs, and Optimal Monetary Policy

被引：13

作者：

Faia, Ester ^{[1
]}

Lechthaler, Wolfgang ^{[2
]}

Merkl, Christian ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany

[2] Kiel Inst World Econ, Res Grp Macroecon Policy Market Imperfect, Kiel, Germany

[3] Univ Erlangen Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING | 2014年 / 46卷 / 01期

关键词：

E24; E52; optimal monetary policy; hiring and ring costs; labor selection; policy trade-off; RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR; KEYNESIAN MODEL; STICKY PRICES; FIRING COSTS; UNEMPLOYMENT; SEARCH; FRICTIONS; DEMAND; WAGE;

D O I：

10.1111/jmcb.12099

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study optimal monetary policy and welfare properties of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a labor selection process, labor turnover costs, and Nash bargained wages. We show that our model implies inefficiencies that cannot be offset in a standard wage bargaining regime. We also show that the inefficiencies rise with the magnitude of firing costs. As a result, in the optimal Ramsey plan, the optimal inflation volatility deviates from zero and is an increasing function of firing costs.

引用

页码：115 / 144

页数：30

共 48 条

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Abbritti Mirko, 2009, LABOR MARKET INSTITU

[2] Gaps and triangles [J].