Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability

被引：40

作者：

Eagle, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Philosophy, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

ERKENNTNIS | 2004年 / 60卷 / 03期

关键词：

Empirical Science; Successful Analysis; Propensity Analysis; Dispositional Analysis; Adequate Explication;

D O I：

10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6a

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fila to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.

引用

页码：371 / 416

页数：46