Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions

被引:2
作者
Wittman, Donald [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Dept Econ, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA
关键词
VALENCE; COMPETITION; CANDIDATE; MODEL;
D O I
10.1017/S0007123413000161
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy or something akin to a monarchy, in which heredity plays a primary role. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control of church doctrine and finances. They also induce different institutional responses. This article explains cases in which screening is highly institutionalized and when a person's age may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. It thus explains what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, over time. The study also applies the methodology to politics more generally by looking at elections in Venice and Genoa in the eighteenth century and the appointment of leaders in present-day China.
引用
收藏
页码:717 / 739
页数:23
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