A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods:: Experimental evidence

被引:149
作者
Falkinger, J [1 ]
Fehr, E
Gächter, S
Winter-Ebmer, R
机构
[1] Univ Regensburg, Dept Econ, D-93040 Regensburg, Germany
[2] Univ Zurich, Inst Empir Res Econ, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Univ Linz, Dept Econ, A-4040 Linz, Austria
[4] Ctr Policy Res, London, England
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.90.1.247
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:247 / 264
页数:18
相关论文
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