Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency

被引：27

作者：

Alos-Ferrer, Carlos ^{[1
]}

Weidenholzer, Simon

机构：

[1] Univ Konstanz, Dept Econ, D-78457 Constance, Germany

[2] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, A-1010 Vienna, Austria

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 93卷 / 02期

基金：

奥地利科学基金会;

关键词：

local interactions; coordination games; learning; mutation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a circular city model as in Ellison [Ellison, G., 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61, 1047-1071], where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best-response. If interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors, payoff-efficient equilibria, and not risk-dominant ones, can be uniquely selected. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：163 / 168

页数：6

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