Drivers of compliance monitoring in forest commons

被引:17
作者
Epstein, Graham [1 ,2 ]
Gurney, Georgina [3 ]
Chawla, Sivee [3 ]
Anderies, John M. [4 ,5 ]
Baggio, Jacopo [1 ,6 ]
Unnikrishnan, Hita [7 ,8 ]
Tomas, Sergio Villamayor [9 ]
Cumming, Graeme S. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cent Florida, Sch Polit Secur & Int Affairs, Orlando, FL 32816 USA
[2] Univ Waterloo, Sch Environm Resources & Sustainabil, Waterloo, ON, Canada
[3] James Cook Univ, ARC Ctr Excellence Coral Reef Studies, Townsville, Qld, Australia
[4] Arizona State Univ, Sch Human Evolut & Social Change, Tempe, AZ USA
[5] Arizona State Univ, Sch Sustainabil, Tempe, AZ USA
[6] Univ Cent Florida, Natl Ctr Integrated Coastal Res, Sustainable Coastal Syst Cluster, Orlando, FL 32816 USA
[7] Univ Sheffield, Urban Inst, ICOSS, Sheffield, S Yorkshire, England
[8] Azim Premji Univ, Sch Dev, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India
[9] Autonomous Univ Barcelona, Inst Environm Sci & Technol, Barcelona, Spain
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
COLLECTIVE ACTION; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; EXPLAINING SUCCESS; LOCAL RULEMAKING; COMMUNITY FOREST; GROUP-SIZE; RESOURCES; INSTITUTIONS; ENFORCEMENT; DECENTRALIZATION;
D O I
10.1038/s41893-020-00673-4
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
A study of 177 forest user groups shows that these are more likely to self-organize to monitor rule compliance for forest management when the groups are larger, they design the rules and they are located either close to or far from markets. Lasting community-based governance of common-pool resources depends on communities self-organizing to monitor compliance with rules. Monitoring serves an important function in community-based governance by establishing conditions for long-term cooperation, but the factors that foster its provision are poorly understood. We have analysed data from 177 forest user groups to assess the relative importance of 15 potential drivers of compliance monitoring, as well as the direction and form of their relationships. The results suggest that user groups are most likely to successfully self-organize to monitor compliance when rules are designed by local user groups (local rulemaking), and when those user groups are located close to or far from markets for forest products and have a larger number of members. Additionally, local leadership plays an important role in certain contexts, such as groups that are smaller in size and located near markets for forest products.
引用
收藏
页码:450 / 456
页数:7
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