Position-taking and electoral accountability in the US House of Representatives

被引:42
作者
Bovitz, Gregory L. [1 ]
Carson, Jamie L. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1177/106591290605900211
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
While past research has offered some initial evidence linking patterns of position-taking behavior with incumbents' electoral fortunes, we are left without a comprehensive study that informs us whether individual roll-call votes can be electorally consequential and lends insight into the conditions under which position-taking on roll calls may yield electoral implications. This article takes a step toward filling that void by examining the electoral implications of hundreds of House roll calls since the early 1970s. We find that, after controlling for the usual factors, a wide range of individual roll-call decisions have significant effects on incumbents' electoral margins. We also find that the extent to which a particular roll call is controversial, salient, and a catalyst for intra-party disagreement affects whether it has electoral implications. In sum, our analysis addresses long-standing questions regarding how and when legislators are rewarded or punished at the polls for their behavior in Congress.
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页码:297 / 312
页数:16
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