Chair-CEO generation gap and bank risk-taking

被引：43
作者：
Zhou, Yifan [1 ]
Kara, Alper [2 ]
Molyneux, Philip [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Leicester, Sch Business, Leicester, Leics, England
[2] Univ Huddersfield, Business Sch, Huddersfield, W Yorkshire, England
[3] Univ Sharjah, Coll Business Adm, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates
来源：
BRITISH ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2019年 / 51卷 / 04期
关键词：
Bank governance; Board diversity; Age difference; Generational gap; Bank risk-taking; European banks; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; TOP MANAGEMENT; PERFORMANCE EVIDENCE; BOARD STRUCTURE; SOCIAL INTEGRATION; INTEREST-RATES; DEFAULT RISK; PANEL-DATA; AGE; DIRECTORS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.bar.2019.03.005
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Poor bank governance has disastrous consequences for economies as the 2007-2009 financial crisis has shown. In the aftermath, board diversity is identified as an effective mechanism to enhance bank governance. Diversity, creating cognitive conflict between board members, is expected to enhance board's independence of thought to better perform monitoring and advising functions. Age is a key demographic measure and age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO in non-financial firms leads to better economic outcomes (Goergen, Limbach, & Scholz, 2015). In this paper, we examine whether chair-CEO age dissimilarity can mitigate banks' excessive risk-taking behaviour. Using a unique sample of 100 listed banks in Europe between 2005 and 2014, we find that age difference between the chair and the CEO reduces bank risk-taking. A chair-CEO generational gap defined as a minimum of 20 years' age difference has a larger impact in reducing risk-taking. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：352 / 372
页数：21
相关论文
共 122 条
  • [1] Risk in Islamic Banking
    Abedifar, Pejman
    Molyneux, Philip
    Tarazi, Amine
    [J]. REVIEW OF FINANCE, 2013, 17 (06) : 2035 - 2096
  • [2] Adams R.B., 2003, FRBNY EC POLICY REV, P123
  • [3] Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance
    Adams, RB
    Almeida, H
    Ferreira, D
    [J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2005, 18 (04) : 1403 - 1432
  • [4] A theory of friendly boards
    Adams, Renee B.
    Ferreira, Daniel
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2007, 62 (01) : 217 - 250
  • [5] Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies
    Adams, Renee B.
    Mehran, Hamid
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, 2012, 21 (02) : 243 - 267
  • [6] The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
    Adams, Renee B.
    Hermalin, Benjamin E.
    Weisbach, Michael S.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, 2010, 48 (01) : 58 - 107
  • [7] Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance
    Adams, Renee B.
    Ferreira, Daniel
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 94 (02) : 291 - 309
  • [8] Governance and the Financial Crisis
    Adams, Renee Birgit
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, 2012, 12 (01) : 7 - 38
  • [9] Risk management, corporate governance, and bank performance in the financial crisis
    Aebi, Vincent
    Sabato, Gabriele
    Schmid, Markus
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2012, 36 (12) : 3213 - 3226
  • [10] Differences in Governance Practices between U.S. and Foreign Firms: Measurement, Causes, and Consequences (Reprinted from The Review of Financial Studies, vol 22, pg 3131-3169, 2009)
    Aggarwal, Reena
    Erel, Isil
    Stulz, Rene
    Williamson, Rohan
    [J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2010, 23 (03) : 3131 - 3169
12345678910