Role of Investment Heterogeneity in the Cooperation on Spatial Public Goods Game

被引:61
作者
Yuan, Wu-Jie [1 ]
Xia, Cheng-Yi [2 ]
机构
[1] Huaibei Normal Univ, Coll Phys & Elect Informat, Huaibei, Peoples R China
[2] Tianjin Univ Technol, Tianjin Key Lab Intelligence Comp & Novel Softwar, Minist Educ, Key Lab Comp Vis & Syst, Tianjin, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
PROMOTES COOPERATION; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; NETWORK RECIPROCITY; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; EMERGENCE;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0091012
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Public cooperation plays a significant role in the survival and maintenance of biological species, to elucidate its origin thus becomes an interesting question from various disciplines. Through long-term development, the public goods game has proven to be a useful tool, where cooperator making contribution can beat again the free-rides. Differentiating from the traditional homogeneous investment, individual trend of making contribution is more likely affected by the investment level of his neighborhood. Based on this fact, we here investigate the impact of heterogeneous investment on public cooperation, where the investment sum is mapped to the proportion of cooperators determined by parameter a. Interestingly, we find, irrespective of interaction networks, that the increment of a ( increment of heterogeneous investment) is beneficial for promoting cooperation and even guarantees the complete cooperation dominance under weak replication factor. While this promotion effect can be attributed to the formation of more robust cooperator clusters and shortening END period. Moreover, we find that this simple mechanism can change the potential interaction network, which results in the change of phase diagrams. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in other social dilemmas.
引用
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页数:6
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