A critique is given of the pure-science model in animal welfare science, according to which the scientific study of animal welfare is a purely objective, ethically neutral activity. Against this view it is argued that the conception of animal welfare inherently implies value notions about the quality of life of the animal. One of these notions is the concept of the intrinsic value of animals. Different interpretations of this concept exist in the literature. A key concept in these interpretations is the concept of the species-specific nature of the animals concerned. To acknowledge the moral relevance of this concept, one has to leave the anthropocentric moral attitude towards nature and adopt a more biocentric attitude. The biocentric attitude implies respect for the intrinsic value of animals, taking into account their species-specific (essential) nature and their individual integrity An important implication of this interpretation of the intrinsic value of animals for animal welfare studies is that absence of pain/suffering is only one of the morally relevant criteria involved.