Socioemotional Wealth as a Mixed Gamble: Revisiting Family Firm R&D Investments With the Behavioral Agency Model

被引：398

作者：

Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. ^{[1
]}

Campbell, Joanna Tochman ^{[2
]}

Martin, Geoffrey ^{[3
]}

Hoskisson, Robert E. ^{[4
]}

Makri, Marianna ^{[5
]}

Sirmon, David G. ^{[6
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Notre Dame, Mendoza Coll Business, Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA

[2] Univ Arkansas, Sam M Walton Coll Business, Fayetteville, AR 72701 USA

[3] Melbourne Business Sch, Carlton, Vic, Australia

[4] Rice Univ, Jones Grad Sch Business, Houston, TX USA

[5] Univ Miami, Sch Business Adm, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA

[6] Univ Washington, Foster Sch Business, Seattle, WA 98195 USA

来源：

ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE | 2014年 / 38卷 / 06期

关键词：

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; RISK-TAKING; TECHNOLOGICAL-INNOVATION; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS;

D O I：

10.1111/etap.12083

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Theoretical explanations for family firm underinvestment in R&D relative to nonfamily firms remain nascent. We revisit this question using a refinement to the behavioral agency model (BAM)the mixed gamblethat allows us to examine the socioemotional trade-offs that R&D represents for the family firm and how this differentiates their R&D investment decision from nonfamily firms. We do so in an empirical context where R&D investment is of greatest importancehigh-technology industries. Moreover, we examine three contingencies that allow us to explore heterogeneity across family firms in their R&D decisions due to their effect upon the family's socioemotional wealth mixed gamble: institutional investor ownership, related diversification, and performance hazard.

引用

页码：1351 / 1374

页数：24

共 88 条

[1] Social networking relationships, firm-specific managerial experience and firm performance in a transition economy: A comparative analysis of family owned and nonfamily firms [J].

Acquaah, Moses .

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2012, 33 (10) :1215-1228

[2] The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation [J].

Aggarwal, RK ;

Samwick, AA .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1999, 107 (01) :65-105

[3] Moving Beyond Schumpeter: Management Research on the Determinants of Technological Innovation [J].

Ahuja, Gautam ;

Lampert, Curba Morris ;

Tandon, Vivek .

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT ANNALS, 2008, 2 :1-98

[4] POWER, PERFORMANCE, AND SUCCESSION IN THE LARGE CORPORATION [J].

ALLEN, MP ;

PANIAN, SK .

ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1982, 27 (04) :538-547

[5] Founding-family ownership, corporate diversification, and firm leverage [J].

Anderson, RC ;

Reeb, DM .

JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 2003, 46 (02) :653-684

[6] Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 [J].

Anderson, RC ;

Reeb, DM .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (03) :1301-1328

[7] Agency costs and ownership structure [J].

Ang, JS ;

Cole, RA ;

Lin, JW .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2000, 55 (01) :81-106

[8]

[Anonymous], 14769 NAT BUR EC RES

[9] Is CEO pay in high-technology firms related to innovation? [J].

Balkin, DB ;

Markman, GD ;

Gomez-Mejia, LR .

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2000, 43 (06) :1118-1129

[10] TOWARD A CONTINGENCY THEORY OF COMPENSATION STRATEGY [J].

BALKIN, DB ;

GOMEZMEJIA, LR .

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1987, 8 (02) :169-182

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 →