The Function in The Propositon of The 'Function- Argumen' Discrimination in The Philosophy of Frege and on The Polysemy of The Term "Value "

The aim of this article is to examine the formal logic terminology of Gottlob Frege, which is the sign of the attempt to formalize arithmetic propositions through a symbolic logic language, and to demonstrate how Gottlob Frege, one of the pioneer philosophers of 20th century philosophy, applies the 'function -argument' distinction to judgments. On the other hand, the distinction between the concepts of "argument value ", "function value " and "truth value " is explained in order to eliminate the contradictions arising from the use of the term "value " in three different meanings, which is important for this distinction. In the light of this distinction, three different uses of the term 'value' are tried to be expressed through three different terms. Instead of the concepts of 'value', 'function value' and 'truth value', it is suggested to use the concepts of 'argument', 'thought' and 'reference', respectively, and the basis of this suggestion is explained. Since it is necessary to mention the philosopher's way of expressing his judgments in the language of formal logic and the function-argument distinction in order to say something about the subject in question, after these subjects are summarized, the terminological analysis of the term 'value' will be examined. Therefore, this article explains the 'function-argument' PRIME distinction under the guidance of the term'value' in order to avoid an ambiguity that may arise from the different meanings and functions of the term 'value' in Frege terminology.