Pipeline Risk in Leveraged Loan Syndication

被引：25

作者：

Bruche, Max ^{[1
]}

Malherbe, Frederic ^{[2
,3
]}

Meisenzahl, Ralf R. ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Humboldt Univ, Berlin, Germany

[2] UCL, London, England

[3] CEPR, Washington, DC USA

[4] Fed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL USA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2020年 / 33卷 / 12期

关键词：

SECURITIZATION; LIQUIDITY; MARKET; SALES;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhaa029

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

What is the economic role played by arrangers of leveraged loans, and what are the risks they face? We provide evidence that arrangers solve a demand discovery problem. Investors have incentives to feign little interest in the loan to obtain better terms. To deter such behavior, arrangers underprice hot deals and ration investors on cold deals. The risk associated with demand discovery is often shared between borrowers and arrangers. One implication is that to ration investors on cold deals, arrangers retain larger loan shares. This motive for retention is different from the monitoring incentive motive previously considered in the literature.

引用

页码：5660 / 5705

页数：46

共 36 条

[1] The Leverage Ratchet Effect [J].