Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach for Modeling Civil Violence

被引:21
作者
Quek, Han-Yang [1 ]
Tan, Kay Chen [1 ]
Abbass, Hussein A. [2 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Singapore 117576, Singapore
[2] Univ New S Wales, Australian Def Force Acad, Sch Informat Technol & Elect Engn, Canberra, ACT 2600, Australia
关键词
Civil violence; evolution; game theory; multiagent; social network; WARS; GRIEVANCE; GREED;
D O I
10.1109/TEVC.2009.2019826
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
This paper focuses on the development of a spatial evolutionary multiagent social network for studying the macroscopic-behavioral dynamics of civil violence, as a result of microscopic game-theoretic interactions between goal-oriented agents. Agents are modeled from multidisciplinary perspectives and their strategies are evolved over time via collective coevolution and independent learning. Spatial and temporal simulation results reveal fascinating global emergence phenomena and interesting patterns of group movement and autonomous behavioral development. Extensions of differing complexity are also used to investigate the impact of various decision parameters on the outcome of unrest. Analysis of the results provides new insights into the intricate dynamics of civil upheavals and serves as an avenue to gain a more holistic understanding of the fundamental nature of civil violence.
引用
收藏
页码:780 / 800
页数:21
相关论文
共 64 条
  • [1] Ames RogerT., 1993, Sun-Tzu
  • [2] the Art of Warfare: The First English Translation Incorporating the Recently Discovered Yin-Ch'ueh-Shan Texts
  • [3] [Anonymous], P 4 WORKSH ART LIF
  • [4] [Anonymous], 2006, 12125 NAT BUR EC RES
  • [5] [Anonymous], 1991, Feedback Thought in Social Science and Systems Theory
  • [6] [Anonymous], 1997, COMPLEXITY COOPERATI
  • [7] [Anonymous], P EUR C ART LIF
  • [8] [Anonymous], 1998, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES P
  • [9] [Anonymous], 1987, Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing
  • [10] Axelrod R, 2006, HANDB ECON, V13, P1565