Income inequality and social preferences for redistribution and compensation differentials

被引：33

作者：

Kerr, William R. ^{[1
,2
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机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 2014年 / 66卷

关键词：

Inequality; Social preferences; Social norms; Redistribution; Welfare; Class warfare; TECHNICAL CHANGE; MOBILITY; DEMAND; SIZE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Countries with greater inequality typically exhibit less support for redistribution and greater acceptance of inequality (e.g., U.S. versus Western Europe). If individual nations evolve along this pattern, a vicious cycle could form with reduced social concern amplifying primal increases in inequality. Exploring movements around these long-term levels, however, this study finds mixed evidence regarding the vicious cycle hypothesis. Larger compensation differentials are accepted as inequality grows. Weighing against this, growth in inequality is met with greater support for government-led redistribution. Inequality shocks can be reinforced in the labor market but do not result in weaker political preferences for redistribution. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：62 / 78

页数：17

共 37 条

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