The shapley value in totally convex multichoice games

被引：3

作者：

Ayoshin, DA ^{[1
]}

Tanaka, T

机构：

[1] Hirosaki Univ, Fac Sci, Dept Informat Sci, Hirosaki, Aomori 0368561, Japan

[2] Hirosaki Univ, Fac Sci & Technol, Dept Math Syst Sci, Hirosaki, Aomori 0368561, Japan

来源：

APPLIED MATHEMATICS LETTERS | 2000年 / 13卷 / 04期

关键词：

multichoice game; shapley value; total convexity; core; coalition;

D O I：

10.1016/S0893-9659(99)00216-5

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we introduce a class of totally convex multichoice cooperative games and prove that the Shapley value of such games is always in the core. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：95 / 98

页数：4

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Zarzuelo, 1995, ZOR MATH METHODS OPE, V41, P289, DOI [10.1007/BF01432361, DOI 10.1007/BF01432361]

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