Why I'm still a proportionalist

被引:7
作者
Rieder, Travis N. [1 ]
机构
[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Berman Inst Bioeth, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA
关键词
Humean Theory of Reasons; Proportionalism; Mark Schroeder; Weighting reasons; REASONS; KIND;
D O I
10.1007/s11098-015-0489-y
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Mark Schroeder has, rather famously, defended a powerful Humean Theory of Reasons. In doing so, he abandons what many take to be the default Humean view of weighting reasons-namely, proportionalism . On Schroeder's view, the pressure that Humeans feel to adopt proportionalism is illusory, and proportionalism is unable to make sense of the fact that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. He thus offers his own 'Recursive View', which directly explains how it is that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. In this paper, I argue against Schroeder that a Humean ought to be a proportionalist. On my view, proportionalism is clearly an intuitive theory of weighting for a Humean, so we should resist it only if Schroeder can demonstrate either that there is a serious problem with the view, or that there is a better alternative. I then further argue that Schroeder fails to deliver on either condition. As a result, I conclude that there are good intuitive reasons for a Humean to be a proportionalist, and no good reason not to be.
引用
收藏
页码:251 / 270
页数:20
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