Blowing the whistle

被引：84
作者：
Apesteguia, Jose
Dufwenberg, Martin [1 ]
Selten, Reinhard
机构：
[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[2] Univ Arizona, Econ Sci Lab, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[3] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Business, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[4] Univ Bonn, Expt Econ Lab, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
来源：
ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 31卷 / 01期
关键词：
anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment communication;
D O I：
10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally.
引用
收藏
页码：143 / 166
页数：24
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