The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation

被引：48

作者：

Calvo, E ^{[1
]}

Lasaga, JJ ^{[1
]}

Winter, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM, CTR RAT & INTERACT DESIS THEORY, IL-91904 JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 1996年 / 31卷 / 03期

关键词：

TU games; shapley value; balanced contributions; potential function; level structures;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4896(95)00806-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The principle of balanced contributions has appeared repeatedly in the literature on the Shapley value. This principle is akin to the reciprocity properties shared by almost all cooperative solution concepts. We provide a new axiomatization for the level structure value. This axiomatization has the advantage that it can be applied to many important subdomains of TU games. We use the Hart-Mas-Colell potential function as a tool to prove our main result, and establish another interesting characterization for the value as a by-product.

引用

页码：171 / 182

页数：12

共 16 条

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