How does clientelism foster electoral dominance? Evidence from Turkey

被引:17
作者
Arslantas, Duzgun [1 ,2 ]
Arslantas, Senol [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Cologne, Germany
[2] Int Max Planck Res Sch Social & Polit Constitut E, Herbert Lewin Str 2, D-50931 Cologne, Germany
[3] Istanbul Univ, Istanbul, Turkey
关键词
AKP; clientelism; dominance; monitoring; urban poor; POLITICAL CLIENTELISM; PATRONAGE; PARTIES; SUCCESS; MEDIA; LOGIC; AKP;
D O I
10.1177/2057891120920718
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This article reveals how the AKP's use of clientelism contributes to its electoral dominance. It does so by examining the features and actors as well as the structure of the clientelist network. The arguments are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most densely populated districts of Bagcilar, where in the 2015 legislative elections the AKP achieved more votes than in any other district in Istanbul.
引用
收藏
页码:559 / 575
页数:17
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