Assertion and relative truth

被引：3

作者：

Caso, Ramiro ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Buenos Aires, Dept Philosophy, Area Log & Philosophy Language, Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina

来源：

SYNTHESE | 2014年 / 191卷 / 06期

关键词：

Assessment sensitivity; Assertion; Truth norm; Evans' problem; Taste predicates;

D O I：

10.1007/s11229-013-0329-6

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

An account of assertion along truth-relativistic lines is offered. The main lines of relativism about truth are laid out and the problematic features that assertion acquires in the presence of relative truth are identified. These features are the possibility of coherently formulating norms of assertion and the possibility of grounding a rational practice of assertion upon relative truth. A solution to these problems is provided by formulating norms for making and assessing assertions that employ a suitably relativized truth predicate and a perspectival notion of correctness. Two potential objections to this proposal are addressed.

引用

页码：1309 / 1325

页数：17

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