Bargaining with endogenous deadlines

被引：2

作者：

Mauleon, A

Vannetelbosch, V

机构：

[1] Univ Catholique Louvain, CORE, FNRS, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[2] Univ Catholique Louvain, IRES, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[3] Univ Catholique Lille, CNRS, URA 362, LABORES, Lille, France

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2004年 / 54卷 / 03期

关键词：

bargaining; alternating-offers; deadlines; complete information;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information that makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the undominated Nash equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique undominated Nash equilibrium outcome is always inefficient. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：321 / 335

页数：15

共 23 条

[1] THE IMPACT OF STRIKES ON SHAREHOLDER EQUITY [J].