Does board committee independence affect financial distress likelihood? A comparison of China with the UK

被引:14
作者
Ashraf, Sumaira [1 ,2 ]
Felix, Elisabete G. S. [3 ,4 ]
Serrasqueiro, Zelia [5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Madeira, Sch Technol & Management, Penteada Univ Campus, P-9020105 Funchal, Portugal
[2] Univ Madeira, CITUR UMa, Penteada Univ Campus, P-9020105 Funchal, Portugal
[3] Univ Evora, Dept Management, Largo Colegiais 2, P-7000803 Evora, Portugal
[4] Univ Evora, CEFAGE UE, Largo Colegiais 2, P-7000803 Evora, Portugal
[5] Univ Beira Interior, Management & Econ Dept, Rua Marques Avila & Bolama, P-6201001 Covilha, Portugal
[6] Univ Beira Interior, CEFAGE UBI, Rua Marques Avila & Bolama, P-6201001 Covilha, Portugal
关键词
Financial distress; Conditional logit analysis; Propensity score matching; Corporate governance; Board independence; Board committees; INFLUENCE FIRM PERFORMANCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; AUDIT COMMITTEES; CRISIS EVIDENCE; DIRECTORS; BANKRUPTCY; PREDICTION; BUSINESS;
D O I
10.1007/s10490-020-09747-5
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This study explores the relationship between board committees' independence and the financial distress of firms in China and the UK. Akin to previous literature, we estimate this relationship between 2007 and 2016 using a conditional logit model on a sample of matched pair firms. For China, the results indicate a positive and statistically significant association between the percentage of independent audit committee members and the financial distress of firms. In contrast, the opposite relationship was found for independent compensation and nomination committee members. For the UK, the relationships are the same, but the results are significant only for nomination committee independence. Our overall results suggest that independent audit committee members are not favorable for firm survival. In contrast, the independent compensation and nomination committee members are beneficial for the financial health of firms, as they are responsible for designing fair compensation packages and for selecting the most suitable persons to decide the strategic moves of the firm, respectively. A robustness test demonstrates that the results are robust to the assumed functional form imposed by the conditional logit model and confirms our core findings for both Chinese and UK firms.
引用
收藏
页码:723 / 761
页数:39
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