No Work for a Theory of Grounding

It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation- 'Grounding'-is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold 'in virtue of'', be (constitutively) 'metaphysically dependent on', or be 'nothing over and above' some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence-for example, type or token identity, functional realization, classical mereological parthood, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on-which are capable of answering these questions. But, I argue, once the specific relations are on the scene, there is no need for Grounding.