Freedom and obligation in Locke's account of belief

Locke's account of belief formation poses a number of philosophical and practical difficulties. As John Passmore and others have shown, Locke appears to hold both that belief is involuntary (in the sense that assent is determined by the balance of available probabilities), and that it is in significant measure voluntary (insofar as we are sometimes free to disregard even the most suggestive evidence). In this paper, I argue that Locke's aim was neither to defend an involuntary nor a voluntary conception of belief, but rather to emphasize our God-given obligations with respect to our beliefs, in our paradoxical condition as beings both created and free. Once this perspective is adopted, it becomes clear that Locke's account of belief formation is both internally consistent and (contrary to claims made by Jeremy Waldron) compatible with the requirements of his case for religious toleration. Where this account breaks down, however, is in demonstrating that we do, in fact, have the ability (and not just the duty) to regulate our beliefs - a power which Locke is ultimately only able to establish by appealing to the justice and omnipotence of God.