Executive Compensation and Risk Taking

被引：106

作者：

Bolton, Patrick ^{[1
,2
]}

Mehran, Hamid ^{[3
]}

Shapiro, Joel ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, NBER, New York, NY 10027 USA

[2] Columbia Univ, CEPR, New York, NY 10027 USA

[3] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY USA

[4] Univ Oxford, Said Business Sch, CEPR, Oxford OX1 2JD, England

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCE | 2015年 / 19卷 / 06期

关键词：

CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP; CEO COMPENSATION; INVESTMENT; DEBT; LIQUIDITY; BEHAVIOR; SPREADS; FIRM;

D O I：

10.1093/rof/rfu049

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This article studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive demonstrates that (i) excess risk taking can be addressed by basing compensation on both stock price and the credit default swaps (CDS) spread, (ii) shareholders may not be able to commit to design such contracts, and (iii) they may not want to due to distortions from deposit insurance or unobservable tail risk. The advantage of using the CDS spread rather than deferred compensation or debt is due to the fact that it is a market price and reduces agency costs.

引用

页码：2139 / 2181

页数：43