Does female presence on corporate boards impact firm performance? Evidence from listed firms in Central Eastern Europe

被引：2

作者：

Havran, Daniel ^{[1
]}

Primecz, Henriett ^{[2
]}

Lakatos, Zsolt ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Corvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Finance, Budapest, Hungary

[2] Corvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Org Behav, Budapest, Hungary

来源：

JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES | 2020年

关键词：

gender diversity of the corporate board; Central-Eastern Europe; corporate governance; return on assets; GENDER DIVERSITY; WOMEN DIRECTORS; GOVERNANCE; DYNAMICS;

D O I：

10.5771/9783748907190-37

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Our study investigates the impacts of corporate board gender diversity on firm performance in six Central and Eastern European postsocialist EU member countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria). We discuss the postsocialist legacy and its impact on gender order in organizations. We find that the higher gender diversity of management boards enhances firm performance despite the fact that the numbers of female top managers do not reach the critical mass on the boards. By exploring the drivers of the placements in the management board, we also find that glass cliff is an existing phenomenon in the region.

引用

页码：37 / 68

页数：32

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