Tax evasion, tax corruption and stochastic growth

被引:18
作者
Celimene, Fred [1 ]
Dufrenot, Gilles [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Mophou, Gisele [5 ]
N'Guerekata, Gaston [6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Antilles & La Guyane, Lab CEREGM1A, Univ Antilles & Guyane, F-97275 Schoelcher, France
[2] Aix Marseille Univ, Aix Marseille Sch Econ, F-13290 Aix En Provence, France
[3] CNRS, F-13290 Aix En Provence, France
[4] Banque France, EHESS, CEPII, F-13290 Aix En Provence, France
[5] Univ Antilles & La Guyane, Lab CEREGMIA, Univ Antilles & Guyane, Campus Fouillole, Pointe A Pitre 97159, Guadeloupe, France
[6] Morgan State Univ, Baltimore, MD 21239 USA
关键词
Stochastic growth; Tax evasion; Tax corruption; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.econmod.2014.10.055
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper presents a continuous time stochastic growth model to study the effects of tax evasion and tax corruption on the level and volatility of private investment and public spending that are both factors of growth. The model highlights several channels through which the mean and volatility of these variables are affected. We first stress the role of equity markets, showing that the evasion outcome for the private sector is not necessarily viewed as a burden. Equity market performs here have the same role as a policy of tax exemption. In societies in which the share of private investment in percentage of GDP is growing, in which tax cheaters usually choose to shelter the proceeds of their illegal activities from the official financial institutions, and in which the productivity of public spending is often low, tax evasion and tax corruption may contribute to the development of private capital if people find an opportunity to invest the proceeds of their illegal activities in equity markets. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:251 / 258
页数:8
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