Towards Balancing Privacy and Efficiency: A Principal-Agent Model of Data-Centric Business

被引：1
作者：
Zimmermann, Christian [1 ]
Nolte, Claus-Georg [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Freiburg, D-79106 Freiburg, Germany
来源：
SECURITY AND TRUST MANAGEMENT (STM 2015) | 2015年 / 9331卷
关键词：
Privacy economics; Privacy; Property rights; Accountability; Principal-agent model;
D O I：
10.1007/978-3-319-24858-5_6
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
Personal data has emerged as a crucial asset of the digital economy. However, unregulated markets for personal data severely threaten consumers' privacy. Based upon a commodity-centric notion of privacy, this paper takes a principal-agent perspective on data-centric business. Specifically, this paper presents an economic model of the privacy problem in data-centric business, in that drawing from contract theory. Building upon a critical analysis of the model, this paper analyzes how regulatory and technological instruments could balance efficiency of markets for personal data and data-subjects' right to informational self-determination.
引用
收藏
页码：89 / 104
页数：16
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