The government's mobilization strategy following a disaster in the Chinese context: an evolutionary game theory analysis

China is a country that suffers frequently from natural catastrophic events. Because of its limited resources, the government requires the assistance of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in providing relief to affected communities. Previous studies on the government's mobilization strategy following a disaster are surprisingly scarce, and the few existing studies typically neglected the differences between government-owned NPOs (GONPOs) and grassroots NPOs (GRNPOs). In the Chinese context, GONPOs rely on resources provided by the government and are amenable but have low initiative, while GRNPOs are highly enthusiastic but difficult to manage. This study identified the government's discriminative strategy toward GONPOs and GRNPOs in coping with a disaster. Drawing on the evolutionary game theory, this study examined the interactive mechanism and factors in the relationship of the government with GONPOs and GRNPOs in disaster mobilization. Moreover, the optimal strategy is identified considering the cooperation benefit, reward incentive, punishment for nonfeasance, efficiency of response, cost of coordination, and value of legitimacy. Based on the results, this study provided practical implications both for the government and NPOs in disaster mobilization.