Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

被引：23

作者：

Ehlers, L ^{[1
]}

Klaus, B

机构：

[1] Univ Montreal, Dept Sci Econ, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada

[2] Univ Montreal, CIREQ, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada

[3] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dept Econ & Hist Econ, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2004年 / 32卷 / 04期

关键词：

indivisible objects; resource-monotonicity;

D O I：

10.1007/s001820400177

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

引用

页码：545 / 560

页数：16

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