Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

被引：14

作者：

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol ^{[1
]}

McLean, Richard P. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, Piscataway, NJ 08855 USA

来源：

THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2014年 / 9卷 / 03期

关键词：

Discontinuous game; potential game; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; stable set; essential equilibrium; C72; PURE; STABILITY; PERFECT;

D O I：

10.3982/TE1178

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

引用

页码：555 / 582

页数：28

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