Social influence promotes cooperation in the public goods game

Previous studies mainly consider the random selection pattern in which individuals randomly choose reference models from their neighbors for strategy updating. However, the random selection pattern is unable to capture all real world circumstances. We institute a spatial model to investigate the effects of influence-based reference selection pattern on the evolution of cooperation in the context of public goods games. Whenever experiencing strategy updating, all the individuals each choose one of its neighbors as a reference with the probability proportional to this neighbor's influence. Levels of individuals' influence are dynamical. When an individual is imitated, the level of its influence increases, thus constituting a positive feedback between the frequencies of individuals being imitated and the likelihood for them to be reference models. We find that the level of collective cooperation can be enhanced whenever the influence-based reference selection pattern is integrated into the strategy updating process. Results also show that the evolution of cooperation can be promoted when the increase in individuals' frequency of being imitated upholds their influence in large magnitude. Our work may improve the understanding of how influence-based selection patterns promote cooperative behavior. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.