Food for all: An agent-based model to explore the emergence and implications of cooperation for food storage

被引:16
作者
Angourakis, Andreas [1 ]
Ignacio Santos, Jose [2 ]
Manuel Galan, Jose [2 ]
Balbo, Andrea L. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Barcelona, Dept Prehist Ancient Hist & Archaeol, ERAAUB, Barcelona 08001, Spain
[2] Univ Burgos, Escuela Politecn Super, Burgos, Spain
[3] Spanish Natl Res Council IMF CSIC, Inst Mila & Fontanals, Complex & Socioecol Dynam CaSEs, Barcelona, Spain
关键词
Agent-based modelling; Cooperation; Reciprocity; Food storage; Cooperative food stock; Common-pool resources; SOCIAL DILEMMAS; GROUP IDENTITY; HUNTER; EVOLUTION; PRESERVATION; PUNISHMENT; GRANARIES; COVENANTS; DYNAMICS; ORIGINS;
D O I
10.1179/1749631414Y.0000000041
中图分类号
K85 [文物考古];
学科分类号
0601 ;
摘要
A consistent access to food is paramount for humans at individual and group level. Besides providing the basic nutritional needs, access to food defines social structures and has stimulated innovation in food procurement, processing and storage. We focus on the social aspects of food storage, namely the role of cooperation for the emergence and maintenance of common stocks. Cooperative food stocks are examined here as a type of common-pool resource, where appropriators must cooperate to avoid shortage (i.e. the tragedy of commons). 'Food for all' is an agent-based model in which agents face the social dilemma of whether or not to store in a cooperative stock, adapting their strategies through a simple reinforcement learning mechanism. The model provides insights on the evolution of cooperation in terms of storage efficiency and considering the presence of social norms that regulate reciprocity. For cooperative food storage to emerge and be maintained, a significant dependency on the stored food and some degree of external pressure are needed. In fact, cooperative food storage emerges as the best performing strategy when facing environmental stress. Likewise, an intermediate control over reciprocity favours cooperation for food storage, suggesting that concepts of closed reciprocity are precursors to cooperative stocks, while excess control over reciprocity is detrimental for such institution.
引用
收藏
页码:349 / 363
页数:15
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