Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Accounting Information Distortion by Listed Companies

被引：0

作者：

Lu, Fangyuan ^{[1
]}

Qiu, Bingxian ^{[1
]}

Fan, Yunfei ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Zhengzhou Univ, Sch Business, Zhengzhou 450001, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND SECURITY, VOL I | 2009年

关键词：

accounting information distortion; evolutionary game; duplicative dynamic; evolutionary stable strategy;

D O I：

10.1109/ISECS.2009.60

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzed the behavior of strategy-selecting in interaction among Certified Public Accountants, the listed companies and regulatory authorities in market with the evolutionary game theory. The result shows that if the gain for producing distorted accounting information by listed companies is larger than the loss of being discovered and punished by regulatory authorities, or the supervising cost of regulatory authorities is too high, the distorted accounting information emerge inevitably; enforcing the punishment on listed companies and delinquent Certified Public Accountants for their producing distorted accounting information, containing their motive of producing distorted accounting information, are all the important ways to eliminate distorted accounting information provided by listed companies.

引用

页码：116 / 119

页数：4