Transactions costs and capital structure choice: Evidence from financially distressed firms

被引:184
作者
Gilson, SC
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2329560
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress,, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.
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页码:161 / 196
页数:36
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