Cost Allocation for Joint Replenishment Models

被引:46
作者
Zhang, Jiawei [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, Dept Informat Operat & Management Sci, New York, NY 10012 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
GAMES; CORE; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1287/opre.1070.0491
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We consider the one-warehouse multiple retailer inventory model with a submodular joint setup cost function. The objective of this model is to determine an inventory replenishment policy that minimizes the long-run average system cost over an infinite time horizon. Although the optimal policy for this problem is still unknown, a class of easy-to-implement power-of-two policies are 98% effective. This paper focuses on how the cost, under an optimal power-of-two policy, should be allocated to the retailers. This question generates an interesting cooperative game. We prove that this cooperative game has a nonempty core. The key to our result is a strong duality theorem for the one-warehouse multiple retailer problem under power-of-two policies.
引用
收藏
页码:146 / 156
页数:11
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