Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions

被引：3

作者：

Winn, Abel M. ^{[1
]}

Parente, Michael L. ^{[2
]}

Porter, David ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Chapman Univ, Argyros Sch Business & Econ, One Univ Dr, Orange, CA 92866 USA

[2] Off Fed Publ Defender, Capital Habeus Unit, 321 E 2nd St, Los Angeles, CA 90012 USA

[3] Chapman Univ, Econ Sci Inst, One Univ Dr, Orange, CA 92866 USA

来源：

SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2016年 / 82卷 / 03期

关键词：

MARKET POWER; BEHAVIOR; VICKREY; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1002/soej.12086

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers' behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral.

引用

页码：760 / 780

页数：21

共 27 条

[1] Experimental comparisons of auctions under single- and multi-unit demand
Alsemgeest, P
Noussair, C
Olson, M
[J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1998, 36 (01) : 87 - 97
[2] [Anonymous], 2009, Auction Theory
[3] AUSUBEL L. M., 2002, DEMAND REDUCTI UNPUB
[4] Ausubel L.M., 1998, AUCTIONING SEC UNPUB
[5] Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions
Banks, J
Olson, M
Porter, D
Rassenti, S
Smith, V
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2003, 51 (03) : 303 - 350
[6] An experimental examination of the Walrasian tatonnement mechanism
Bronfman, C
McCabe, K
Porter, D
Rassenti, S
Smith, V
[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1996, 27 (04) : 681 - 699
[7] Budish Eric B., 2013, 1403 CHIC BOOTH
[8] Ascending auctions
Cramton, P
[J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1998, 42 (3-5) : 745 - 756
[9] Cramton Peter, 1999, MARKET ENV, P255
[10] MARKET POWER AND MERGERS IN LABORATORY MARKETS WITH POSTED PRICES
DAVIS, DD
HOLT, CA
[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 25 (03) : 467 - 487

← 1 2 3 →