ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY AND PRIVATE DUOPOLY - 'CAPACITY-THEN-QUANTITY' GAME: THE LINEAR DEMAND CASE

被引:15
作者
Lu, Yuanzhu [2 ]
Poddar, Sougata [1 ]
机构
[1] Hanyang Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Seoul 133791, South Korea
[2] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China
关键词
FORGOTTEN EQUILIBRIUM; ENTRY-DETERRENCE; OLIGOPOLY; STACKELBERG; INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-8454.2009.00369.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
引用
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页码:138 / 150
页数:13
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