Dividend policy and bank opacity

被引:25
作者
Dung Viet Tran [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Ashraf, Badar Nadeem [4 ]
机构
[1] Banking Acad Vietnam, Banking Fac, Hanoi, Vietnam
[2] Duy Tan Univ, Inst Res & Dev, Da Nang, Vietnam
[3] Univ Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Grenoble INP, CERAG, F-38000 Grenoble, France
[4] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, 1037 Luoyu Rd, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China
关键词
banks; discretionary loan loss provisions; dividends; earnings management; opacity; payout policy; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION-CONTENT; QUALITY; RISK;
D O I
10.1002/ijfe.1611
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Does dividend policy increase or decrease bank opaqueness? Under the Dividend-Transparency Channel, paying dividends involves banks having greater discipline from the markets due to external financing and reduces private benefits of control, leading to lower earnings management concerns. Under the Dividend-Opacity Channel, due to a hesitancy to change dividend policy, banks have high vocations to engage earnings management to circumvent payout policy restrictions in debt covenants or to keep their dividend target unchanged. Employing a large sample of 2,483 U.S. bank holding companies from 2001:Q1-2013:Q4, the study documents the double-edged sword of dividends on the discretionary behaviours of banks. Paying dividends makes banks less opaque to compare with nonpayers, which is consistent with the Dividend-Transparency Channel, however among dividend paying banks, excessive dividends involve banks to manage more their numbers, which is consistent with the Dividend-Opacity Channel. The findings are robust under different specifications. The results are of important interest to bank regulators.
引用
收藏
页码:186 / 204
页数:19
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