Applying cooperative game theory to power relations

被引：5
|
作者：
Wiese, Harald [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Leipzig, D-04009 Leipzig, Germany
来源：
QUALITY & QUANTITY | 2009年 / 43卷 / 04期
关键词：
Shapley value; Coalition functions; Norms; Violence; Power; Power-over; Market power; Emotional dependence; Communication structure; SOCIAL POWER; CENTRALITY; NETWORKS; EXCHANGE;
D O I：
10.1007/s11135-007-9134-y
中图分类号：
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号：
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要：
The power of people and the power of some people over others have long been a topic in sociology, politics, psychology, and, to a lesser extent, economics. This paper shows how cooperative game theory can be used to analyze the power relation between agents 1 and 2. First, we identify payoff reflections of the power of agent 1 over agent 2. Second, we suggest how to look for action reflections of power-over. We will provide many examples and reconsider (an important part of) the power-over literature from the viewpoint of our approach.
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页码：519 / 533
页数：15
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