The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps

被引:11
作者
Capra, C. Monica [1 ]
Tanaka, Tomomi
Camerer, Colin F.
Feiler, Lauren
Sovero, Veronica
Noussair, Charles N.
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
关键词
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION; COORDINATION FAILURE; STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY; GROWTH; CONVERGENCE; GAMES;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02262.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We introduce an experimental approach to study the effect of institutions on economic growth. In each period, agents produce and trade output in a market, and allocate it to consumption and investment. Productivity is higher if total capital stock is above a threshold. The threshold externality generates two steady states - a suboptimal 'poverty trap' and an optimal steady state. In a baseline treatment, the economies converge to the poverty trap. However, the ability to make public announcements or to vote on competing and binding policies, increases output, welfare and capital stock. Combining these two simple institutions guarantees that the economies escape the poverty trap.
引用
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页码:977 / 1009
页数:33
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