Governance of agents in the recruitment of international students: a typology of contractual management approaches in higher education

被引:6
作者
Huang, Iona Yuelu [1 ]
Williamson, David [2 ]
Lynch-Wood, Gary [3 ]
Raimo, Vincenzo [4 ]
Rayner, Charlotte [5 ]
Addington, Lindsay [6 ]
West, Eddie [7 ,8 ]
机构
[1] Harper Adams Univ, Land Farm & Agribusiness Management Dept, Newport TF10 8NB, Shrops, England
[2] Staffordshire Univ, Staffordshire Business Sch, Stoke On Trent, Staffs, England
[3] Univ Manchester, Sch Law, Manchester, Lancs, England
[4] Univ Reading, Pro Vice Chancellors Off Global Engagement, Reading, Berks, England
[5] Univ Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business Sch, Portsmouth, Hants, England
[6] Natl Assoc Coll Admiss Counselling, Global Engagement, Arlington, VA USA
[7] Univ Calif Berkeley, UC Berkeley Extens, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[8] San Diego State Univ, Int Strategy & Programs, SDSU Global Campus, San Diego, CA 92182 USA
关键词
Contractual governance; education agent; fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA); international higher education; typology;
D O I
10.1080/03075079.2020.1861595
中图分类号
G40 [教育学];
学科分类号
040101 ; 120403 ;
摘要
There is an increasing reliance on international education agents for student recruitment in Higher Education (HE), but the governance of education agents is under-researched. This study explores contractual governance approaches adopted by HE institutions for managing international education agents in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis of survey data from HE managers was undertaken involving contractual specificity, coordination, within-contract monitoring, relational contractual governance, market power and number of agents used. It produces a typology of four archetypes: strategic hybrids, pragmatic operators, flexible friends and laissez faire operators. The study reveals that, while the laissez faire approach is a path to failure regardless of the number of agents used and market power, there is no 'one-size fits all' linear contractual governance solution to agency problems and the achievement of results. The findings enable HE managers to better understand their agent management choices and associated outcomes.
引用
收藏
页码:1150 / 1170
页数:21
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