Does Independent Directors' CEO Experience Matter?

被引:55
作者
Kang, Shinwoo [1 ]
Kim, E. Han [2 ]
Lu, Yao [3 ]
机构
[1] Sejong Univ, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Univ Michigan, Ross Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[3] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Industry-CEO experience; Board advising; Value-added growth; Innovation; R&D investments; BOARD SIZE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; DETERMINANTS; INNOVATION; COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; GROWTH;
D O I
10.1093/rof/rfx023
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find the confluence of CEO-same industry experience makes independent directors particularly helpful in enhancing value-added growth and we identify a channel: guidance toward higher value-added R&D investments and higher quality innovations. Further corroborating these inferences, we find greater improvement in value-added growth when (1) independent directors with industry-CEO experience (IDICEs) have experience in more similar industries; (2) they create more shareholder value as CEO; and (3) they are current CEOs. In addition, IDICEs contribute to value-added growth most when firm environments and characteristics are conducive for active board-management interaction; namely, when product markets are more competitive and dynamic, when outsiders can more easily acquire firm-specific information, and when firms are younger and smaller. Consistent with our inferences on how IDICEs contribute to value-added growth, firms growing faster, less successfully innovating, and/or under strong governance tend to be matched with IDICEs.
引用
收藏
页码:905 / 949
页数:45
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