CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses

被引：335

作者：

Grinstein, Y ^{[1
]}

Hribar, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Cornell Univ, Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 73卷 / 01期

关键词：

CEO compensation; mergers and acquisitions;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.06.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market responds more negatively to their acquisition announcements. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial power is the primary driver of M&A bonuses. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：119 / 143

页数：25

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