Ambiguity and social interaction

被引：35

作者：

Eichberger, Juergen ^{[1
]}

Kelsey, David ^{[2
]}

Schipper, Burkhard C. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Heidelberg Univ, Alfred Weber Inst, D-6900 Heidelberg, Germany

[2] Univ Exeter, Dept Econ, Exeter EX4 4PU, Devon, England

[3] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA

来源：

OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 2009年 / 61卷 / 02期

基金：

英国经济与社会研究理事会;

关键词：

C72; D43; D62; D81; MAXMIN EXPECTED UTILITY; KNIGHTIAN UNCERTAINTY; EQUILIBRIUM; GAMES; RISK; PROBABILITY; AVERSION; BELIEFS;

D O I：

10.1093/oep/gpn030

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A decision-maker is said to have an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to be represented by a single probability distribution. The pervasive assumption in game theoretic models in economics is that players beliefs are unambiguous. This paper argues, drawing on examples from economics and politics, that it may be illuminating, in instances, to model players as having ambiguous beliefs. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.

引用

页码：355 / 379

页数：25

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