Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments

We consider matching problems with endowments and analyze the manipulability of the men-optimal and the women-optimal matching rule via hiding, perfect hiding, destruction, and predonation of endowments. We show that the men- (resp., women-) optimal matching rule is manipulable by women (resp., men) via both types of hiding, as well as by destruction and by predonation of their endowments. In contrast, so long as the hidden part of one's endowment cannot be consumed alone, a man (resp., woman) can manipulate the men- (resp., women-) optimal matching rule only by predonating a portion of his (resp., her) initial endowment (to men or women). We consider the manipulability of matching rules under monotonic consumption rules. We show that the men-optimal matching rule is non-manipulable via hiding by a man under any monotonic consumption rule. We also characterize the maximal subclass of monotonic consumption rules under which a woman can manipulate the men-optimal matching rule via destruction (or via hiding). We offer a similar analysis for the manipulability of the men-optimal matching rule via perfect hiding. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.